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Abstract 
Two recent developments have changed the face of private prosecutions in Zimbabwe. 
Firstly, the prosecutor general had to decide: (1) whether private companies may institute 
private prosecutions; and (2) whether the prosecutor-general, if he had declined to 
prosecute, was obliged to issue a certificate to a crime victim to institute a private 
prosecution. Both questions were answered in the negative. Victims of crime challenged this 
in court and the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor-general is obliged to issue a 
certificate should he decline to prosecute. In response, the prosecutor-general adopted two 
strategies: (1) to apply to the Constitutional Court against the Supreme Court’s ruling that he 
is obliged to issue such a certificate; and (2) to have the relevant sections of the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act (CPEA) amended so that the law clearly states that he is not 
obliged to issue such a certificate, and that companies are not permitted to institute private 
prosecutions. This article argues that despite these recent amendments to the CPEA, there 
are cases where the prosecutor-general may be compelled to issue a certificate to a crime 
victim to institute a private prosecution. These developments are important for South Africa, 
as a South African non-governmental organisation has petitioned the courts and argued that 
a law prohibiting it from instituting private prosecutions is discriminatory and therefore 
unconstitutional. South African courts may find Zimbabwean case law helpful in resolving 
this issue. 
 
One feature of an effective government is its ability to enforce the law and have those who 
break it prosecuted and sanctioned. All over the world, government officials are entrusted 
with the responsibility of prosecuting those alleged to have broken the law. However, in 
Zimbabwe and some other African jurisdictions such as Swaziland, South Africa, Uganda, 
Zambia, Seychelles and Mauritius, a public prosecutor can choose whether or not to 
prosecute a suspect, even if there is evidence that the suspect committed an offence.1 This 
discretion is open to abuse; a fact that courts in countries such as the United Kingdom 
(UK)and South Africa have recognised.2 It is partly because of this that in some countries a 
victim of crime has the right to institute a private prosecution against a person they believe 
perpetrated a crime against them. Since public prosecutors traditionally have the duty and 
right to prosecute crimes, the victim’s right to institute a private prosecution is not welcomed 
by some public prosecutors, who view it as a threat to their independence. As the Supreme 
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Court of Zimbabwe stated in Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v AG of Zimbabwe N.O., ‘the 
practice has always been for the State jealously to guard its right to prosecute offenders’.3 
Two recent legal developments have changed the face of private prosecutions in Zimbabwe. 
These relate to: (1) whether private companies may institute private prosecutions; and (2) 
whether the prosecutor general, in the event that he has declined to prosecute, is obliged to 
issue a certificate to a victim of crime allowing him or her to institute a private prosecution. 
Both questions were answered in the negative by the prosecutor-general. Victims of crime 
went to court to seek clarity on these issues (these cases are discussed below). The Supreme 
Court has held that juristic persons, such as private companies, have a right to institute 
private prosecutions and that the prosecutor-general is obliged to issue a certificate should 
he decline to prosecute. In response, two strategies were adopted: (1) the prosecutor-general 
applying to the Constitutional Court challenging the Supreme Court’s ruling; and (2) the 
government having the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (CPEA) 
amended to make it clear that the prosecutor-general is not obliged to issue such a 
certificate, and that companies are not permitted to institute private prosecutions. In this 
article I argue that there will be cases where the prosecutor-general may be compelled to 
issue a certificate to a victim of crime to institute a private prosecution, even if recent 
amendments to the CPEA are passed. These developments are important for South Africa, 
because a South African nongovernmental organisation (NGO) has petitioned the courts and 
argued that a law prohibiting it from instituting private prosecutions is discriminatory and 
therefore unconstitutional. South African courts may find Zimbabwean case law helpful in 
resolving this issue.4 Although the article highlights the CPEA amendments, it is beyond its 
scope to analyse them. Rather, I explore the options that are likely to be available to a victim 
of crime, should the prosecutor-general decline to issue a certificate to institute a private 
prosecution. In order to put the discussion in context, it is important to review the law 
governing private prosecutions in Zimbabwe and the circumstances that have led to its 
amendment. 
 
Private prosecutions in Zimbabwe and recent case law from the Supreme Court 
In Zimbabwe the issue of private prosecutions is not dealt with in the Constitution but in the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (CPEA).5 There are many sections relevant to private 
prosecutions in the CPEA but only those relevant to this article are discussed. Section 13 of 
the CPEA provides that where the prosecutor-general has declined to prosecute any offence, 
‘any private party, who can show some substantial and peculiar interest in the issue of the 
trial arising out of some injury which he individually has suffered by the commission of the 
offence’ may institute a prosecution against the alleged perpetrator. Section 14 provides a list 
of persons who have a right to institute a private prosecution; that is, people with ‘substantial 
and peculiar interest’ as a result of the commission of the offence. This list includes the 
victim of a crime, a husband in the case of an offence committed against his wife (but not vice 
versa), and the legal guardian or representative of some categories of victim. Section 16(1), 
which is to be amended, provides that: (1) Except as is provided by subsection (2), it shall not 
be competent for any private party to obtain the process of any court for summoning any 
party to answer any charge, unless such private party produces to the officer authorised by 




statements or affidavits on which the charge is based and declines to prosecute at the public 
instance, and in every case in which the [prosecutor-general] declines to prosecute he shall, 
at the request of the party intending to prosecute, grant the certificate required.6 Section 20 
provides that: In the case of a prosecution at the instance of a private party, the [prosecutor-
general] or the local public prosecutor may apply by motion to any court before which the 
prosecution is pending to stop all further proceedings in the case, in order that prosecution 
for the offence may be instituted or continued at the public instance and such court shall, in 
every such case, make an order in terms of the motion.7 The following are most important 
among these sections: One, a victim of crime has a right to institute a private prosecution. 
the categories of people who may institute private prosecutions are limited. Referring to 
jurisprudence from South African courts, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held in Telecel 
Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v AG of Zimbabwe N.O. that: The object of the phrase [‘substantial and 
peculiar interest’] was clearly to prevent private persons from arrogating to themselves the 
functions of a public prosecutor and prosecuting in respect of offences which do not affect 
them in any different degree than any other member of the public; to curb, in other words, 
the activities of those who would otherwise constitute themselves public busybodies … 
Permission to prosecute in such circumstances was conceived as a kind of safety-valve. An 
action for damages may be futile against a man of straw and a private prosecution affords a 
way of vindicating those imponderable interests other than the violent and crude one of 
shooting the offender. The vindication is real: it consoles the victim of the wrong; it protects 
the imponderable interests involved by the deterrent effect of punishment and it sets at 
naught the in road into such inalienable rights by effecting ethical retribution. Finally it 
effects atonement, which is a social desideratum.8 Three, for a victim of crime to institute a 
private prosecution s/he needs a certificate from the prosecutor-general. But having such a 
certificate does not automatically mean a victim must institute a private prosecution. Apart 
from the fact that s/he must offer a security deposit to the court, s/he may not proceed with a 
private prosecution if the court thinks it an abuse of process. The Supreme Court held that 
‘notwithstanding the possession of a certificate, the court may, in the exercise of its inherent 
power to prevent abuse of process, interdict a private prosecution pursuant to such 
certificate’.9 Another issue is whether under section 16 of the CPEA the prosecutor-general is 
obliged to issue a certificate should he decline to prosecute. In answering this question, the 
Supreme Court referred to a case from the High Court of South Africa that dealt with a 
similar issue, and held that: The language of s 16(1) of the CP&E Act is categorically clear … 
In any event, in construing this provision, we must also have regard to the [prosecutor-
general’s] constitutionally guaranteed independence and wide discretion in matters of 
criminal prosecution. Taking this into account, it seems to me that the exercise of his 
discretion vis-à-vis any intended private prosecution involves a two-stage process. The first 
stage is for him to decide whether or not to prosecute at the public instance. If he declines to 
do so, the next stage comes into play, i.e. to decide whether or not to grant the requisite 
certificate. In so doing, he must take into account all the relevant factors prescribed in s 13 of 
the Act … If he cannot show any such interest, the [prosecutor-general] is entitled to refuse to 
issue the necessary certificate. However, where the private party is able to demonstrate the 
required ‘substantial and peculiar interest’ and attendant criteria, the [prosecutor-general] is 




becomes peremptory and s 16(1) can no longer be construed as being merely permissive or 
directory. This conclusion clearly does not impinge on the [prosecutorgeneral’s] principal 
discretion to prosecute or not to prosecute at the public instance. That decision is an incident 
of his constitutional primacy in the sphere of criminal prosecution and is generally not 
reviewable. Indeed … [he can take over private proceedings under section 20 of the CPEA]. 
However, once he has declined to prosecute and is met with a request for private prosecution 
by a party that satisfies the ‘substantial and peculiar interest’ requirement of s 13, he has no 
further discretion in the matter and is statutorily bound by s 16(1) to issue the requisite 
certificate.10 The Supreme Court makes it clear that the prosecutor-general is not obliged to 
issue a certificate simply because he has declined to prosecute. However, the prosecutor-
general is obliged to issue a certificate once the private party has demonstrated that they 
have a substantial and peculiar interest and that they meet the other criteria under section 
16. The challenge though is that the South African High Court decision, which was relied on 
by the Supreme Court in its decision on this issue, has been criticised in a subsequent High 
Court (full bench) decision.11 The criticism was that there was a long line of cases that 
expressly stated that it is not for the South African director of public prosecutions but for the 
court to determine whether a private prosecutor has a substantial and peculiar interest in the 
matter. In 2015 the South African Supreme Court of Appeal stated that ‘[t]he prosecuting 
authority is obliged to furnish a certificate called nolle prosequi to someone who wishes to 
prosecute privately’.12 This means that it is no longer a valid precedent in South Africa. 
Another important issue that the court dealt with is whether juristic persons and in 
particular companies may institute private prosecutions. It should be recalled that the CPEA 
does not expressly state that legal/juristic persons may or may not institute private 
prosecutions. The prosecutor-general’s argument, based on South African case law, was that 
companies may not institute private prosecutions. The Supreme Court relied on earlier 
jurisprudence from the then Federal Court of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Zimbabwean 
legislation to hold that there is nothing that expressly prohibits companies from instituting 
private prosecutions. The court also distinguished the relevant South African case law on the 
subject and held that a ‘private corporation, is entitled to institute a private prosecution in 
terms of s 13 of the Act. However, this entitlement is subject to the issuance of a certificate 
nolle prosequi under s 16(1)’ by the prosecutor-general if he/she is satisfied that the private 
corporation ‘meets the requirements of s 13’.13 What is not clear is whether a private 
company has a right or an entitlement to institute a private prosecution. The court uses both 
words interchangeably. What is clear is that the fact that the victim is a private corporation 
may not be the sole reason upon which the prosecutor-general bases his or her decision to 
refuse to issue a certificate to institute a private prosecution. Another issue that the court 
dealt with was whether the prosecutor-general’s decision not to issue a certificate to a victim 
who meets the requirements in the Act is reviewable. The court, referring to English and 
Zimbabwean case law on the issue of reviewing irrational or unreasonable administrative 
decisions, held that on the facts of the case it was dealing with, the prosecutor-general’s 
decision not to issue a certificate to the applicant could not be reviewed on the ground of 
irrationality. This is because the facts did not show that ‘his decision is so irrational in its 
defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no reasonable person in his position who 




respondent’s decision was illegal and therefore reviewable, the court held that: [T]urning to 
the legality of the respondent’s decision not to issue his certificate, it is clear that he has 
failed to exercise his statutory powers on a proper legal footing. Having declined to prosecute 
at the public instance, he should have considered whether or not the appellant satisfied the 
‘substantial and peculiar interest’ requirement of s 13 of the Act. He did not do so but 
proceeded to decline his certificate nolle prosequi on the basis that there was insufficient 
evidence to prosecute. He consequently failed to correctly understand and give effect to the 
requirements of s 16(1) which regulated his decision-making power. Put differently, by 
withholding his certificate, he was guilty of an error of law by purporting to exercise a power 
which in law he did not possess. He thereby contravened his duty to act lawfully in 
accordance with the peremptory injunction of s 16(1). This constitutes a manifest 
misdirection at law rendering his decision reviewable on the ground of illegality.15 The above 
decision makes it very clear that under certain circumstances the prosecutor-general is 
obliged to issue a certificate to a private prosecutor to prosecute. However, the prosecutor 
general was determined to render that court ruling irrelevant, and set about his task, using 
two strategies. One, he approached the Constitutional Court, arguing that he is the only 
person with the discretion to decide whether or not to issue a certificate. This application was 
a result of contempt of court proceedings brought against him for refusing to issue a 
certificate to the guardian of a minor rape victim to institute a private prosecution against a 
powerful politician who allegedly sexually assaulted and raped the girl and whom the 
prosecutor-general declined to prosecute. This application was heard at the end of October 
2015 and dismissed (see discussion below). The second strategy, which is likely to render the 
outcome of the application to the Constitutional Court moot, involved the November 2015 
National Assembly’s passing of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Bill which, 
inter alia, amends section 16 of the CPEA. This was the second time that amendments to 
section 16 had been passed. They were first passed in October 2015. Following fierce 
opposition from some members of Parliament, the initial amendments were withdrawn and 
the new amendments were introduced. However, before the amendment can come into force, 
the bill must be approved by Senate and sent to the president for assent, following which, the 
date on which the act will commence must be published in the Government Gazette. Six days 
after the initial amendments were passed by the National Assembly and before the bill could 
be tabled before Senate, the Constitutional Court found the prosecutor-general guilty of 
contempt of court because of his refusal to issue certificates to private prosecutors. He was 
sentenced to 30 days’ imprisonment unless he issued the certificates within 10 days. He 
issued the certificates and in January 2016 one of the victims instituted a private prosecution 
against a powerful politician who allegedly sexually assaulted and raped her. At this point it 
is apt to review the amendments. 
 
Amendments to the CPEA 
In this section I highlight the amendments introduced with regard to private prosecutions. 
The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Bill amends various sections of the 
CPEA.16 Relevant to this discussion is section 16. The memorandum to the bill states that: 
Under section 16 of the Act, no one can institute a private prosecution unless the prosecutor 




the name of the State. This clause will remove any suggestion that the prosecutor-general is 
compelled (despite being constitutionally mandated to initiate or discontinue all 
prosecutions) to issue such a certificate. It also prohibits any corporate body or registered or 
unregistered association from applying for or receiving such a certificate. Clause 6, which 
amends section 16, provides that, as a general rule, a private prosecutor shall not institute a 
private prosecution if s/he is not in possession of a certificate from the prosecutor-general 
stating that ‘he or she has seen the statements or affidavits on which the charge is based and 
declines to prosecute at the public instance’. The prosecutor-general is obliged to grant the 
certificate in question if a private prosecutor requests it in writing (in the form of a sworn 
statement), and if the applicant: (i) is the victim of the alleged offence, or is otherwise an 
interested person by virtue of having personally suffered, as a direct consequence of the 
alleged offence, an invasion of a legal right beyond that suffered by the public generally; and 
(ii) has the means to conduct the private prosecution promptly and timeously; and (iii) will 
conduct the private prosecution as an individual (whether personally or through his or her 
legal practitioner), or as the representative of a class of individuals recognised as a class for 
the purposes of the Class Actions Act.17 The amendment allows the prosecutor-general to 
refuse to grant a certificate to the applicant if one of the following arise: ‘(a) that the conduct 
complained of by the private party does not disclose a criminal offence; or (b) that on the 
evidence available, there is no possibility (or only a remote possibility) of proving the charge 
against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt; (c) that on the facts alleged, there is a civil 
remedy available to the private party that will meet the justice of his or her case equally well 
or better; (d) whether the person to be prosecuted has adequate means to conduct a defence 
to the charge; or (e) that it is not in the interests of national security or the public interest 
generally to grant the certificate to the private party.’18 Some members of Parliament were 
opposed to these amendments for the following reasons: one, they deprive victims of crime 
their right to institute a private prosecution as they give the prosecutor-general discretion in 
issuing certificates; two, they are contradictory in that they appear to oblige the prosecutor-
general to issue a certificate should he decline to prosecute, but give him the discretion to 
decide whether or not to issue the certificate; three, they are unconstitutional because they 
empower the prosecutor-general to exercise judicial powers (determining whether or not a 
victim of crime has a prima facie case); and four, they deprive victims of their right to remedy 
should the prosecutor-general decline to prosecute.19 These submissions address all 
significant weaknesses in the amendments. In the next and final section, I consider the 
future of private prosecutions in Zimbabwe in light of these amendments. I give particular 
attention to whether there are circumstances in which the prosecutor general may be 
compelled to issue a certificate to a victim of crime. 
 
The future of private prosecutions instituted by crime victims in Zimbabwe 
What are the issues likely to define or shape the future of private prosecutions in Zimbabwe? 
As stated earlier, some opposition members of Parliament were of the view that the 
amendments effected by section 16 are unconstitutional. If Senate were to pass the 
amendment and the president assents to the bill, its constitutionality may be challenged 
before the Constitutional Court and the court may declare it unconstitutional. Were the court 




will be declined. This is because the prosecutor-general has the discretion to refuse to issue a 
certificate. Were this to happen, victims aggrieved by the prosecutor-general’s decision 
would have to challenge it in court. As discussed above, the prosecutor-general’s decision 
may be reviewed by a court if it is irrational or unreasonable. It may also be reviewed if it is 
illegal. If a court finds the decision not to issue a certificate to a private prosecutor to be 
irrational or unreasonable or illegal, it would have to set it aside and order the prosecutor-
general to issue such a certificate. It should be noted that section 260(1)(b) of the 
Constitution provides that the prosecutor-general ‘must exercise his or her functions 
impartially and without fear, favour, prejudice or bias’.20 If a court finds that the decision not 
to issue a certificate to a private prosecutor was made contrary to any of the grounds laid 
down in section 260(b), that decision would have to be set aside and the prosecutor general 
would have to issue a certificate. This is the case although section 260(1)(a) provides that the 
prosecutor-general shall be ‘independent and is not subject to the direction or control of 
anyone’. It would be erroneous to interpret this provision to mean that the prosecutor-
general cannot be ordered by a court to perform or refrain from performing an act. To 
interpret ‘anyone’ under section 160(1)(a) to include a court of law would be a mistake and 
would put the prosecutor-general above the law. It should also be noted that section 164(3) 
of the Constitution provides that ‘an order or decision of a court binds the State and all 
persons and governmental institutions and agencies to which it applies, and must be obeyed 
by them’. The prosecutor-general’s decision may also be reviewed under section 68(1) of the 
Constitution on administrative law grounds. Related to this, the prosecutor-general may take 
over a private prosecution, whether based on a certificate he has issued voluntarily or after a 
court order, for the purpose of stopping it. As mentioned, section 20 of the CPEA allows a 
public prosecutor to take over a private prosecution. Whereas section 20 is clear that a public 
prosecutor may take over a private prosecution for the purpose of instituting or continuing 
with such a prosecution at the public instance, it does not state that a public prosecutor may 
take over a private prosecution for the purpose of stopping it. However, the moment a 
private prosecution is taken over by a public prosecutor; it ceases to be a private prosecution. 
A public prosecutor may therefore stop it. This means that a public prosecutor may decline 
such a prosecution using his discretion not to prosecute. In Canada, the UK, Mauritius, 
Vanuatu, Tonga, Singapore, Samoa and Australia, public prosecutors take over private 
prosecutions and either continue with them, as public prosecutions, or discontinue them.21 
On 4 September 2015 Zimbabwe’s prosecutor-general published in the Government Gazette 
the ‘General principles by which the National Prosecuting Authority decides whether and 
how to institute and conduct criminal proceedings’, which, inter alia, states the 
circumstances in which he may take over and discontinue a private prosecution.22 This raises 
the question of whether there are circumstances in which a public prosecutor’s decision not 
to prosecute may be reviewed. The Administrative Justice Act categorises decisions to 
institute, continue or discontinue criminal proceedings and prosecutions as administrative 
actions. The challenge is that these decisions cannot be reviewed under this act. This is 
because the critical provisions of the act, which would have enabled the victim to know why a 
decision was taken by a public prosecutor to discontinue criminal proceedings, and to make 
representations to the prosecutor to challenge a possible discontinuation, are not applicable 




prosecutions. This means the private prosecutor cannot make an application to the High 
Court to order the public prosecutor to supply reasons why he discontinued a prosecution. 
This means that a court may have to use its inherent common jurisdiction to review such 
decisions. And as explained, this would require the applicant to convince a court that the 
public prosecutor’s decision to discontinue the prosecution was either irrational or illegal. 
Importantly, in Swaziland, Seychelles and South Africa, courts have held that a public 
prosecutor’s decision to prosecute or not is not beyond judicial scrutiny.23 Whether or not the 
above provisions of the Administrative Justice Act are constitutional in the light of section 68 
of the Constitution, is debatable. Section 62 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that: 1. 
Every Zimbabwean citizen or permanent resident, including juristic persons and the 
Zimbabwean media, has the right of access to any information held by the State or by any 
institution or agency of government at every level, in so far as the information is required in 
the interests of public accountability. 2. Every person, including the Zimbabwean media, has 
the right of access to any information held by any person, including the State, in so far as the 
information is required for the exercise or protection of a right. 3. Legislation must be 
enacted to give effect to this right, but may restrict access to information in the interests of 
defence, public security or professional confidentiality, to the extent that the restriction is 
fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, 
human dignity, equality and freedom.24 In light of section 62 of the Constitution and in the 
spirit of transparency and accountability, one would expect the prosecutor-general to explain 
to a victim why he has decided not to prosecute, or to discontinue a private prosecution. The 
prosecutor general’s failure to share such information could be challenged on the basis that it 
violates the right to access information under section 62 of the Constitution. For the 
prosecutor-general to continue withholding that information he must convince the court that 
he is doing so for any of the following three reasons in the interests of defence, public 
security or professional confidentiality. If the prosecutor-general indeed exercises his powers 
without fear, favour, prejudice or bias, one would expect him to establish and publish 
guidelines for victims wanting to challenge decisions not to prosecute. In some jurisdictions, 
including the UK and Scotland, such guidelines have been published.25 The relevant 
legislation in Zimbabwe is the 2002 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act.26 
This act was enacted before the 2013 Constitution. It provides the right to access information 
(section 5), and the prosecutor general’s decision not to prosecute is not one of the records 
excluded from the application of the act. However, section 17(1)(e) of the act provides that 
‘[t]he head of a public body shall not disclose to an applicant information whose disclosure 
would reveal any information relating to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion’.27 
Under section 17(3)(a) of the act, ‘[t]he head of a public body may disclose, after the 
completion of an investigation by the police, the reasons for a decision not to prosecute to: 
(a) a person who was aware and had an interest in the investigation, including a victim or 
complainant, or relative or friend of a victim or complainant’.28 In terms of section 2, read 
with the second schedule to the sct, the prosecutor-general is a head of a public body. The 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act thus gives the prosecutor-general the 
discretion not to disclose to a victim of crime the information relating to his decision not to 
prosecute. I argue that in the light of section 62(1) of the Constitution, a strong case may be 




unconstitutional, as it may be invoked by the prosecutor-general to evade public 
accountability relating to his decision not to prosecute. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has dealt with the law relating to private prosecutions in Zimbabwe. I have 
focused on the possible effects of CPEA amendments on the ability of victims to participate 
in the criminal justice system by exercising their right to institute private prosecutions. I 
argued that the amendments are likely to limit but not to eliminate the right of these victims 
to institute private prosecutions. I have demonstrated that the prosecutor-general’s decision 
not to issue a certificate to victims of crime to institute private prosecutions may be reviewed 
on the grounds of unreasonableness or illegality. It may also be reviewed under section 68 of 
the Constitution as an administrative action. I have also argued that section 17(3)(a) of the 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act may be unconstitutional for giving the 
prosecutor-general the discretion to decide whether or not to make information relating to 
his decision not to prosecute available to a victim of crime. It is recommended that, in line 
with international trends that recognise the right of victims to participate in criminal justice 
systems, Zimbabwe should adopt measures aimed at strengthening such rights. These 
measures should include strengthening the right to institute private prosecutions. 
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